Approved For Release 2020/45/40: CIA-RDP63-00313A000500020028-5

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NRO & USAF REVIEWS COMPLETED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Research

SUBJECT

: OXCART Security

- 1. In anticipation of expanded LRI and/or RS efforts in the KEDLOCK program, interested OSA components met on 27 August 1962 to consider the impact such expansion would have upon OXCART security. Those present at the meeting generally agreed to the following conclusions.
 - A. Certain critical aspects of the OXCART program must not be compromised as a consequence of expanded KEDLOCK programs. Among these critical aspects are the following.
 - (i) CIA sponsorship of OXCART.
 - (4) Radar cross section reduction techniques and achievements.
 - (3) Existence of an A-12 as a photographic reconnaissance vahicle.
 - (4) OXCART operational concepts, command lines and procedures, i.e. Z I based operations, air-to-air refueling from advanced bases and radar suppression.
 - (5) Performance characteristics of the A-12 as they may differ from other versions, i.e. range, altitude and speeds.
 - (6) Camera and other special equipments development.
 - (7) OXCART covert contracting mechanisms.
 - (8) OXCART operational pilot status.

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(9) Agency communications procedures.
(10) facilities and procedures such as navigational aids, frequencies, approach control, etc.
B. Certain problems which will emerge when a public announcement concerning KEDLOCK is made were also considered.
(1) How is sole source procurement explained?
(2) Who authorized funds to be expended and from what source did the funds come?
(3) What authority has been responsible for contracting, technical supervision and audit?
(4) How has the program developed to its present state without it becoming public knowledge?
C. The magnitude of the problems outlined above, and certain others which have not occurred to us, cannot be assessed realistically until more definitive information is ferthcoming from the DOD and USAF. Specific questions which have a bearing follow:
(1) How many additional aircraft and what version or versions will be purchased?
(2) What is the future of the B-70/RS-70?
(3) What are the delivery schedules of additional LRI or RS-12 aircraft?
(4) Who will be responsible for overt contracting?

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(5) Will aircraft be operated from other bases?

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procurement of RS-12's or addition mutual advantage of the Agency and for the DOD flight test program at If this reasoning is followed, we use to a public explanation for the emit RS vehicle; that is, that technolog to provide a recoverable first stagmilitary applications. Furthermowould help to divert attention to the	to the DOD to provide facilities to some base would tend to give greater credence ergence of an advanced LRI or ical advances in the basic program ge booster led to these additional ere, such a course of action the LRI or RS and away from the ang is the approved approach, could be curtailed, and exposure	
3. In summation, we find ourselves in the position of attempting to develop contingency plans in the absence of essential information needed to make such planning meaningful. Our only positive position at this time can be that we protect to the greatest degree possible those aspects of the OXCART program as enumerated in paragraph 1, A, above. 4. We request your comments regarding the foregoing.		
	JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. Acting Assistant Director (Special Activities)	
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